Attackers Spoof ChatGPT, DeepSeek and Other AI Bots to Target Russian Websites

Threat actors are impersonating popular generative AI assistants by forging User-Agent strings to bypass security controls on Russian web applications. Solar WAF observed the first such requests on 12 August 2026 using the DeepSeekBot identifier, with additional spoofed agents from ChatGPT, Perplexity, Claude and Grok appearing from 27 August. The campaign focuses on small and medium-sized businesses as well as larger corporations. Attackers rely on the growing trust that site owners place in AI crawlers, applying relaxed filtering rules to traffic that appears to originate from legitimate AI services. In 53 percent of detected cases the requests attempted DNS Rebinding attacks aimed at internal resources, while 12 percent sought data exfiltration and 4 percent involved Path Traversal. The remaining 31 percent included classic SQL injection attempts and other reconnaissance techniques. Experts warn that similar AI-masquerading tactics are likely to become more sophisticated and harder to detect with signature-based tools.

AntiMalwareTranslated from Russian

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Threat actors are forging HTTP User-Agent headers to impersonate popular generative AI assistants while scanning and attacking Russian web applications. According to telemetry from Solar WAF, the first malicious requests appeared on 12 August 2026 under the DeepSeekBot identifier. From 27 August the same technique was observed using the strings ChatGPT-User, Perplexity-User, Claude-User and GrokBot.

No traffic carrying these AI-related identifiers was recorded in the monitored dataset during June and July 2026. The attackers exploit the increasing willingness of website owners to treat AI agents as valuable sources of traffic and leads, often granting them more lenient security policies. Because the User-Agent field can be set by any client, it provides no real authentication.

The observed requests were not benign crawling activity. In 53 percent of cases the traffic attempted DNS Rebinding attacks intended to force servers to connect to internal resources. Another 12 percent of requests were linked to data exfiltration attempts, while 4 percent involved Path Traversal to reach files outside permitted directories. The remaining 31 percent comprised other techniques, including traditional SQL injection probes.

Security researchers note that the use of well-known AI brand names is intended to lower the chance of immediate blocking. They expect future campaigns to combine this masquerading method with more advanced evasion tactics that may evade current signature-based detection.

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