Survey of 254 Russian Domains Shows 89% DMARC Adoption but Highlights Gaps in Reporting and Subdomain Policies

A manual review of public DNS records across 254 prominent Russian domains from 17 sectors found strong baseline adoption of email authentication mechanisms. MX records appeared in 96.1% of domains, SPF in 93.7%, DMARC in 89.0%, and DKIM records via common selectors in 62.2%. Among domains with DMARC, 40.7% published a reject policy and 42.9% used quarantine, while 16.4% remained at none. Notably, 19% of DMARC-enabled domains lacked any rua address for aggregate reports, including 33 domains enforcing reject or quarantine. The study also identified cases of inconsistent policies between parent domains and subdomains, as well as SPF records ending in ~all paired with strict DMARC settings. Researchers emphasized that DNS data alone cannot confirm actual mail flow alignment or report consumption.

HabrTranslated from Russian

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A detailed DNS sweep of 254 Russian domains across retail, IT, industry, finance, media, government, telecom and other sectors has revealed high adoption rates for core email authentication records, yet also exposed practical limitations in how those records are configured.

The scan, performed on 28 September 2026, queried MX, SPF, DMARC and 14 common DKIM selectors. It found MX records at 96.1% of domains, SPF at 93.7%, DMARC at 89.0% and DKIM via typical selectors at 62.2%. Two domains returned SERVFAIL for all queries and were counted as having no records.

Among the 226 domains that published DMARC, policies broke down as 40.7% reject, 42.9% quarantine and 16.4% none. Thirty-three of the 43 domains without an rua aggregate reporting address still requested reject or quarantine treatment from receivers.

The researchers noted that 27 domains combined a strict parent-domain policy (reject or quarantine) with sp=none for subdomains, while a small number used pct values below 100. They stressed that DNS records alone cannot verify alignment between SPF or DKIM and the visible From header, nor confirm whether reports are actually received and acted upon.

Sector-level figures showed full SPF and DMARC coverage in the IT and finance samples, though the authors cautioned that the non-representative selection and small group sizes prevent direct comparisons of security maturity.

The study concludes that owners should first confirm whether a domain sends mail at all, review full SPF chains including redirects, test real messages for alignment, examine subdomain inheritance, and validate that rua addresses actually deliver usable reports before tightening policy.

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