SC Malware on WordPress Restores Deleted Backdoors in Seconds via Eight Persistence Points

Researchers at Sucuri have analyzed the SC malware targeting WordPress sites, which rapidly restores any removed backdoor components through a minimum of eight interconnected persistence mechanisms. The infection hides across PHP configuration settings, hidden loaders, theme files, and plugins, with some elements executing before standard WordPress plugins load. Copies of the malicious code are also stored in the database and System V shared memory on supported servers, allowing full reinfection from surviving sources after file cleanup. The backdoor evades plugin listings, gathers site and administrator session data, deploys additional PHP code, and disables security plugins while injecting JavaScript for payment data theft in online stores. Command-and-control occurs through public Ethereum RPC gateways and smart contracts with multiple fallback channels. Sucuri warns that PHP caching of the loader directive can crash request handling if the referenced file is deleted without prior preparation, and recommends a sequenced cleanup process.

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Researchers from Sucuri have dissected a persistent WordPress infection known as SC malware that restores any deleted backdoor components within seconds. The malware achieves this resilience through a minimum of eight interconnected persistence points distributed across multiple layers of the site.

The infection conceals itself in PHP configuration directives, hidden loaders, theme files, and plugins. Several components activate before regular WordPress plugins, rendering standard admin-panel cleanup ineffective and turning remediation into a repetitive loop.

Copies of the malicious code are additionally stored in the site database and, on servers supporting the feature, in System V shared memory. Removing files from disk can therefore be immediately reversed by the next request that pulls the payload from an untouched source.

The backdoor itself remains hidden from the plugin list, collects information about the site and administrator sessions, installs further PHP code, and disables protective plugins. Injected JavaScript is capable of harvesting payment data from e-commerce sites.

Commands are received via public Ethereum RPC gateways and smart contracts, with multiple alternative channels ensuring continued operation even if one address is blocked.

A notable cleanup hazard exists because PHP caches the directive that launches the malicious loader. Deleting the referenced file without first stopping execution can break PHP request handling entirely.

Sucuri advises first halting the malware, then removing database and memory copies along with malicious scheduled tasks and hidden accounts, before finally cleaning files and rotating compromised credentials.

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