Old iPhones Remain Vulnerable to Bootloader Exploits Despite Airplane Mode, OneKey Warns Crypto Users

Founder of hardware wallet maker OneKey Ishan Wang has cautioned that storing cryptocurrency seed phrases on reset older iPhones in airplane mode does not provide reliable protection. Physical access attacks leveraging persistent bootloader vulnerabilities such as checkm8 and usbliter8 can bypass standard iOS security even on devices without network connectivity. The checkm8 exploit affects iPhone models from 4S through X, while usbliter8 targets A12 and A13 chips found in iPhone XS, XR, 11 series and second-generation SE devices. These flaws allow attackers to break the secure boot chain and execute arbitrary code before the operating system loads, and factory resets do not mitigate them because the vulnerable bootloader code cannot be overwritten through normal updates. Although bootloader access alone does not decrypt wallet contents due to device passcode, Secure Enclave protections and application-level encryption, the overall risk depends on device model, iOS version, additional vulnerabilities and password strength. Wang advises against relying on legacy offline iPhones as cold storage and recommends generating a fresh seed phrase and transferring assets if exposure is suspected.

AntiMalwareTranslated from Russian

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Storing a cryptocurrency wallet recovery phrase on a wiped older iPhone placed in airplane mode does not guarantee safety, according to a warning issued by OneKey founder Ishan Wang.

The advisory focuses on physical-access attacks rather than remote theft. Two notable hardware-level vulnerabilities allow an attacker who obtains the device to compromise the boot process. The checkm8 exploit impacts iPhone generations from iPhone 4S to iPhone X. The more recent usbliter8 targets A12 and A13 chips, covering iPhone XS, iPhone XR, the entire iPhone 11 family and the second-generation iPhone SE.

Both flaws enable an attacker to break the trusted boot chain and run code before iOS starts. The usbliter8 attack requires specialized USB hardware. A standard factory reset does not eliminate the risk because the vulnerable bootloader code cannot be replaced by ordinary firmware updates.

Nevertheless, bootloader access by itself does not automatically decrypt wallet data. The device passcode, Secure Enclave processor and application-level encryption continue to serve as protective layers. Actual risk therefore varies according to the specific model, iOS version, presence of additional vulnerabilities and the strength of the passcode.

Wang recommends that users stop treating legacy offline iPhones as dependable cold-storage solutions. If a seed phrase may already have been exposed, simply creating a new address within the same wallet is insufficient; a completely new seed phrase must be generated and assets transferred to it.

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