eMudhra has revoked eight additional intermediate certificate authorities after a detailed review revealed that its custom Python script exposed their RSA private keys in the memory of a ceremony computer.
The company had initially stated on Mozilla's bug tracker that these CAs were unaffected by the October key compromise. However, further analysis showed that the script retrieved the RSA keys from Utimaco HSMs during a transfer process to Crypto4A HSMs, preventing the company from proving compliance with its own CPS §6.2.6 rules on key material handling.
Of the eight newly revoked CAs, six were intended for website TLS certificates and two for code signing. The company placed four of them into production in May 2025. The list of affected certificates includes 195 entries, 29 of which belong to eMudhra's own domains, with the remainder covering universities, colleges, a county government, and other organizations.
Both the original ECDSA key weakness and the RSA key exposure trace back to an April 30, 2025 key ceremony. During this event, 16 CA keys were generated on Utimaco HSMs and a Python script was written to wrap and unwrap keys for transport between different HSM vendors. The script read private keys into the ceremony computer's memory, and while it did not truncate the RSA keys, it left their private components exposed.
The company chose the revocation reason code cessationOfOperation rather than keyCompromise for these eight CAs. Participants in the Mozilla bug thread have questioned this choice. All certificate holders have been migrated to new certificates, and eMudhra is exiting the publicly trusted TLS business.
Microsoft will begin removing the remaining ten eMudhra roots on November 16, while Apple will end trust in all G1 certificates by November 30. Chrome and Firefox will stop trusting G1 certificates issued after November 16.


