Nightmare Eclipse Releases SignDrop Zero-Day Exploit Abusing Windows CLFS for Local Privilege Escalation

Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, known as Nightmare Eclipse, has published a zero-day exploit called SignDrop that targets the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS). The exploit enables a local attacker to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by exploiting flawed logic in how clfs.sys handles authentication file creation for .cnpf container files. Microsoft introduced CLFS logfile authentication last year to verify file integrity, yet SignDrop bypasses this mechanism by coercing Windows Defender to open attacker-specified log files during signature updates. The proof-of-concept has been successfully tested on Windows 11 26H2, Windows 11 26H2 Experimental, and Windows Server 2025 Experimental, covering an estimated 80 percent of Windows installations older than 90 days. Cyderes independently compiled and verified the PoC, finding no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation to date. Microsoft has been contacted for comment but has not yet responded.

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Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, known online as Nightmare Eclipse, this week dropped another zero-day exploit targeting Windows systems. Dubbed SignDrop, the exploit allows a local user to elevate their privileges to System by abusing flawed logic in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS).

CLFS parses complex log files in kernel mode and has long been an attractive target for threat actors. Last year, Microsoft introduced CLFS logfile authentication to mitigate exploitation, which relies on authentication codes to check file integrity. SignDrop, Naceri says, exploits a vulnerability in how clfs.sys handles the creation of the authentication file ‘.cnpf’ during the creation of a log file.

The code responsible for creating/opening both container and log files will always open the container if the original log file is opened. If the container is empty, CLFS attempts to sign it regardless of whether the signature file exists. A standard user can create a log file and specify a path to an associated container in it, and then coerce Windows Defender to open the file in the context of the antimalware engine by calling the signature update RPC interface.

This leads Defender to use the file path specified in the container to open the associated log file. If absent, a signature file is then created with System privileges. SecurityWeek has not tested SignDrop, but understands that the proof-of-concept (PoC) code abuses the mechanism to create a signature file at an attacker-controlled location and then reopens the file to place a payload in it, resulting in the spawning of a System shell.

According to the security researcher, SignDrop has been tested on Windows 11 26H2, Windows 11 26H2 Experimental, and Windows Server 2025 Experimental, and should work on 80% of the world’s Windows installations. “You’re generally vulnerable if your Windows installation is older than 90 days,” Naceri says.

According to cybersecurity services provider Cyderes, which successfully compiled and tested the PoC exploit, there is no evidence that the zero-day has been exploited in the wild. SecurityWeek has emailed Microsoft for a statement on SignDrop and will update this article if the company responds.

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