Enea Identifies SilentAir Espionage Group Compromising Asian Telecom Networks to Intercept SMS 2FA Codes

SilentAir APT Intercepts Calls and SMS via Hijacked Mobile Network Nodes, Primarily Targeting Taiwan

Enea has uncovered a previously unknown threat actor tracked as SilentAir that compromises mobile operator infrastructure to intercept phone calls and text messages. The group primarily targets Taiwan and has also hit victims across a dozen other countries and territories in Asia, East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Researchers assess with high confidence that SilentAir is a new state-level actor and assess with low confidence that its operations align with China-nexus activity based on targeting patterns and working-hour timing. The attackers launch signaling attacks over SS7 and sometimes Diameter from hijacked network nodes, routing incoming calls and SMS through the compromised infrastructure to harvest subscriber data and track locations. Enea has observed the activity since early 2025, with evidence of earlier operations, and notes that SilentAir occasionally sends silent SMS messages to verify interception success. The report also covers separate 2026 activity by Liminal Panda, which exploits the IPX interconnect network and deploys the GTPDoor backdoor against mobile operators.

Threat Actors Exploit PHP2Shell Flaws in Check Point Gateways to Deploy TSGA Backdoor and destroy_v6 Wiper on ESXi Hosts

An unknown threat actor has been targeting unpatched Check Point Security Gateways since October 30, 2026, initially exploiting PHP2Shell vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 to gain access via Mobile Access portals. Attackers then leveraged the local privilege escalation flaw CVE-2026-123039 in Gaia OS DynamicCLI to escalate from the portal service account to root and deploy PHP web shells along with the persistent TSGA backdoor and its TSProxy networking component. The campaign first hit Israeli organizations before expanding on November 2, 2026, to targets across multiple countries and sectors without clear geographic focus. In several cases the actors pivoted via SSH to VMware ESXi hosts, deployed the destroy_v6 wiper malware that recursively overwrites and deletes files, and left politically themed DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes. TSGA and TSProxy are assessed as Check Point-specific elements of the PhiliKit toolkit previously linked by ESET to the China-nexus group Armory Castle (formerly UNC5221). Check Point notes insufficient evidence to attribute the full operation with high confidence and lists possible scenarios including initial-access brokerage or false-flag activity.

Turla APT Deploys Modular Cereal Malware Framework to Harvest Emails from Microsoft Exchange Servers

The Russia-aligned threat actor Turla has been observed deploying a previously undocumented modular toolset called Cereal against government Exchange servers in Kazakhstan and Romania. The framework enables long-term stealthy email collection by abusing compromised Microsoft Exchange instances as internal C2 hubs without any external infrastructure. ESET researchers detailed how Cereal components run in memory, inject into EdgeTransport.exe, and filter messages containing DOC, DOCX or PDF attachments based on hardcoded sender, recipient, subject and attachment rules. In the Romanian incident the malware was configured to target NATO and European Union-related addresses. Commands are delivered as compiled .NET assemblies that CerealRunner executes in memory, supporting Active Directory enumeration, WMI queries, LSA Secrets extraction and file operations. The absence of disk artifacts and the use of serialization throughout the eight-component framework highlight Turla’s deep knowledge of Exchange internals.