Cold Relic Hackers Chain Google Workspace Compromise to Breach Second U.S. Organization via Entra ID Phishing

The Russia-linked espionage group Cold Relic has turned a single cloud intrusion into a stepping stone for additional targeted breaches. After compromising a U.S. organization's Google Workspace tenant in late 2025, the actors harvested employee directories, cloud storage contents, and authentication artifacts. They maintained persistence through registered MFA devices, passkeys, and backup codes while evading detection by manipulating Admin Console logs and Alert Center notifications. Using the stolen data, Cold Relic impersonated employees to phish a second U.S. organization that relied on Microsoft Entra ID as its federated SSO provider for Google Workspace. The attackers obtained credentials, registered their own MFA device, and performed bulk file downloads from the victim's cloud drive. Google Mandiant and GTIG assess that the campaign demonstrates the convergence of social engineering and cloud identity abuse by Russian intelligence services.

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The Russia-linked cyber espionage group Cold Relic (formerly COLDRIVER and UNC4057) has been observed weaponizing a single cloud compromise into a launchpad for a series of linked intrusions resulting in third-party compromise.

Google's Mandiant and Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said it investigated a 2026 compromise at a U.S.-based organization in which the adversary leveraged data, the corporate staff directory, and identities harvested during a late-2025 compromise at a separate U.S.-based entity.

Cold Relic, also tracked as Callisto, Gossamer Bear, and Star Blizzard, has a track record of orchestrating sophisticated phishing and malware campaigns to gain access information that may be of strategic importance to the Russian government. The access is abused to register rogue multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices, passkeys, and MFA backup codes to establish long-term persistence and then conduct aggressive data collection and exfiltration operations targeting email, chat, and cloud storage repositories.

In addition, the compromised access is used to target the victim's social and professional networks. Attacks mounted by the threat actor have successfully compromised high-value targets, including government officials, defense contractors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across Europe and North America.

Google said that once Cold Relic compromises a target, it uses stolen emails and data to establish authentic pretexts and impersonate contacts when reaching out to subsequent targets.

According to the tech giant's cybersecurity and incident response teams, Cold Relic compromised the cloud productivity environment of an unspecified U.S.-based organization in late 2025. Initial access to the network was achieved by means of a residential proxy network located in close geographical proximity to the victim. Using the stolen credentials of a Super Admin account and combining it with an MFA push notification fatigue attack, the threat actor gained access to the account after the victim accepted an MFA request.

This was followed by the attacker registering their own device within the tenant to retain access. The threat actor was also observed using passkeys and MFA backup codes as alternate access mechanisms.

Cold Relic used the privileges of the compromised Super Admin account to download the contents of the entire organization's cloud storage drive by both mass sharing files to a Cold Relic-operated email account and downloading files directly. While operating inside the tenant of the victim organization, Cold Relic accessed the Admin Console, queried Admin security investigation and email audit logs to check defensive visibility, and viewed, modified, and deleted Alert Center notifications to remove forensic evidence of the initial intrusion.

These actions ultimately enabled the threat actor to export full employee lists and domain-wide data via the Google Takeout service using the Super Admin privileges. Following mass data theft, the attackers continued to maintain access over several months and perform additional activities including syncing email inboxes via OAuth to external email clients and re-authenticating using unrevoked attacker-enrolled passkeys that persisted across password and session resets.

Even after the attackers were ousted from the victim organization, Google observed Cold Relic using email accounts impersonating employees of the victim organization to target both internal employees and associates within the same professional circles as part of a renewed social engineering campaign.

The attack then moved to the next phase when the threat actor compromised a Microsoft Entra ID user account of a second U.S.-based organization that used Entra ID as its federated single sign-on (SSO) identity provider for Google Workspace. By impersonating an employee at the first organization, the threat actor established communications over a secure messaging app with the target and then shared phishing links designed to harvest credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID.

Upon successful authentication using the stolen credentials, Cold Relic registered and used a new MFA device in the SSO solution to retain access to the user account throughout the intrusion. By impersonating someone known in the same professional circles as the new target, Cold Relic increased their chance of phishing success and performed bulk download of files accessible in the compromised user's cloud drive.

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