In 2024, an employee at engineering firm Arup was tricked into transferring HK$200 million (approximately US$25.6 million) after attending a fake video conference featuring deepfake versions of their colleagues. A year later, Marks & Spencer suffered a major cyberattack after attackers used social engineering to gain access through a third-party helpdesk. More recently, attackers have impersonated IT support staff to convince employees to hand over remote access to their devices.
While the tactics differ, these incidents raise an important question for IT and security teams: how can organizations be confident that someone requesting access or authorizing a sensitive action is who they claim to be?
The Arup Deepfake Fraud
A finance employee at Arup's Hong Kong office received an email in January 2024 that appeared to come from the company's UK-based CFO, requesting a series of transactions. Initially suspicious, the employee was convinced the request was genuine after joining a video conference featuring what appeared to be the CFO and several colleagues. However, the meeting was a deepfake. According to Hong Kong police, the attackers had used publicly available video and audio to create a convincing pre-recorded conference. The employee subsequently made multiple transfers, losing approximately HK$200 million.
The M&S Cyberattack
In April 2025, British retailer Marks & Spencer suffered a major cyberattack that disrupted operations for weeks. Online orders were suspended, contactless payments and Click & Collect services were affected, and customer data was stolen. The attack was linked to the Scattered Spider cybercriminal group, known for using social engineering to gain access to corporate networks. Marks & Spencer later confirmed that attackers had gained entry by deceiving employees at a third-party contractor.
Fake IT Support
Microsoft recently reported a cyberattack campaign in which threat actors impersonated IT support staff through Microsoft Teams, tricking employees into handing over remote access to their devices. The attackers contacted employees through external Teams messages or calls, posing as internal IT personnel. Using convincing pretexts such as urgent technical issues, they persuaded employees to grant remote control through screen sharing or legitimate support tools like Quick Assist. Once connected, the attackers used PowerShell to install malicious software, establish persistent access and gather information about the compromised network.
How Can Organizations Mitigate These Risks?
Service desk teams should use trusted authentication methods to confirm callers' identities. Specops Secure Service Desk helps organizations build this verification into their service desk processes. Agents can verify callers using more than 15 MFA factors, including options that don't require a phone. As organizations introduce self-service portals and automated IT processes, solutions like the Specops Authentication API can help by allowing organizations to add secure workforce authentication and identity verification to their existing applications and business workflows.


