Scammers Deploy Fake Russian Defense Ministry Websites to Harvest Data from Relatives of Fallen Soldiers

Russian threat intelligence firm F6 has uncovered a phishing campaign that used counterfeit Ministry of Defense portals to target relatives of participants in the special military operation. The attackers registered lookalike domains and populated them with official logos, coats of arms, and navigation menus copied from the legitimate mil.ru site, leaving only the registration form under their control. Victims were invited to register for state awards ceremonies and asked to supply full name, phone number, passport details, SNILS, and INN; an additional “Add guest” button collected the same information for accompanying persons. The stolen data can be used to reset access to government services, apply for microloans, or launch follow-on social-engineering attacks against military families. F6 analysts noted that the fraudulent pages were likely generated with a large language model, evidenced by an unhandled JSON error that appeared only after data submission. Although the discovered domains have been blocked inside Russia, the low technical barrier means new clones can be stood up quickly.

AntiMalwareTranslated from Russian

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Russian cybersecurity company F6 has disclosed a targeted phishing operation that impersonated the Ministry of Defense to collect personal data from relatives of participants in the special military operation.

Attackers created several counterfeit websites that closely mimicked the official resource of the ministry. One of the domains, mil-ru-gov[.]info, was deliberately chosen to resemble the legitimate mil.ru address. The pages featured the ministry’s logo, coat of arms, and navigation menu, with almost all links pointing to genuine ministry content. This visual authenticity was intended to lower visitors’ suspicions, leaving only the registration form under attacker control.

Relatives were told they could register for an awards ceremony honoring fallen service members. The form requested full name, telephone number, passport data, SNILS, and INN. An additional “Add guest” function allowed the same information to be collected for accompanying persons, expanding the dataset in a single session.

Once obtained, the information can be used to reset access to state digital services, open microloans, or conduct further social-engineering attacks. Knowledge of a relative’s name and phone number enables attackers to craft convincing stories about compromised accounts or to pivot toward banking applications.

Researchers at F6 believe the sites were assembled with the assistance of a large language model. A visible JSON parsing error in the registration form indicated that the code was produced rapidly and never fully sanitized. The error did not prevent data exfiltration; it appeared only after the information had already been sent to the attackers’ server.

Distribution methods remain under investigation, but the links were likely sent directly via messengers and email. The identified domains have been blocked in Russia; however, nothing prevents the operators from registering new ones.

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