Email Graph Analysis Detects Impersonated Suppliers When DKIM and SPF Pass

Security researchers have outlined a practical method to identify business email compromise attempts that bypass traditional authentication checks. The approach relies solely on metadata from mail server logs to build communication profiles between external and internal addresses. By tracking first contact, one-way traffic, dormant periods, unusual sending hours, and domain similarity, analysts can flag high-risk messages requesting payment changes. The technique works against mailbox takeover scenarios where attackers reuse legitimate threads and valid signatures. Implementation uses existing Postfix or Microsoft Exchange logs and requires no new infrastructure beyond daily exports. A simplified version focusing only on lookalike domain detection can be built in a single evening and still catches most supplier impersonation attempts.

HabrTranslated from Russian

Read at source

Traditional email security controls such as DKIM, SPF, and DMARC fail when an attacker has already compromised a legitimate supplier mailbox. In these cases the message arrives from the genuine server, carries a valid signature, and continues an existing thread, leaving no technical anomaly to detect.

The only reliable signal lies in the historical pattern of communication between the two parties. Mail gateway logs already contain the necessary metadata: sender, recipient, and timestamp. No message bodies or attachments are required, which simplifies legal and privacy reviews.

From Postfix logs the pairs are extracted with simple shell commands that join queue identifiers. Microsoft Exchange environments provide the same data through the Get-MessageTrace cmdlet, which should be exported daily to accumulate sufficient history.

Each external-internal address pair is profiled with counts, first and last seen dates, inbound versus outbound volume, and hourly distribution. These numbers feed five lightweight indicators:

  • First contact – the address has never appeared before.
  • Lookalike known – the domain is similar to a previously observed supplier domain using a split name-zone comparison that ignores hyphens.
  • Dormant revived – communication resumed after more than 180 days of silence.
  • One-way traffic – dozens of inbound messages with zero replies.
  • Unusual hours – messages arrive outside the established working-hour pattern.

A weighted score combines the indicators so that no single weak signal triggers an alert. High scores can be surfaced as a banner inside the recipient’s mailbox or routed to the SOC for manual review.

The method breaks down for generic addresses such as info@ or sales@ and for organizations that receive fewer than several thousand external messages per day. In those environments the recommended minimum control remains a telephone callback to a known contract number before any banking details are changed.

Meridian digestThe week's most consequential security stories, distilled into one briefing.See the digest

More in Fraud & Social Engineering

Scammers Use *#62# USSD Command to Fabricate Surveillance Claims and Steal Victims' Funds
Aroshka Cloud Faces Scrutiny Over Alleged False Claims of SOC 24/7 Operations and High-End Infrastructure
Reports Surface on Alleged De-Anonymization of Admins Running Major Russian Hacker Forums