FSTEC

Innostage Completes Functional Testing of PT NGFW 1.10.3 Across 156 Criteria

Innostage has published the second part of its evaluation of PT NGFW version 1.10.3, focusing on functional capabilities rather than raw performance. The testing covered 156 individual checks grouped into categories such as basic technical features, firewalling, IDS/IPS, web filtering, malware protection, logging, routing, deployment, cryptographic controls and access management. Out of the total, 136 checks passed fully, seven passed with remarks, and 13 did not meet the predefined criteria. Key confirmed functions include high-availability clustering, centralized management via PT-MNGT, AD-based rule application, Site-to-Site VPN, TLS inspection, and Syslog integration with external security systems. Several advanced scenarios, including custom block pages, application risk classification, and centralized software distribution, were not confirmed under the test conditions. The report provides detailed protocol notes that help organizations map product capabilities against their specific infrastructure and regulatory requirements.

Russian State Duma Approves Outsourcing of Banking Secrecy and Client Data Without Consent

The State Duma has passed legislation in its second and third readings permitting Russian banks to transfer client data processing, including banking secrecy and personal information, to external IT contractors and cloud providers. No separate client consent will be required for such transfers. Only accredited Russian IT companies and banks holding a universal license that meet strict domestic control criteria may act as processors, with all servers required to remain inside Russia. Banks must notify the Central Bank of Russia in advance, and contractors must undergo audits by organizations licensed by FSTEC or FSB Russia. Special approval procedures involving the Central Bank, FSB, and Rosfinmonitoring apply to banks under foreign control. The law preserves banking secrecy while expanding the circle of authorized handlers under defined security obligations.

Asset and Vulnerability Management in Practice: Building a Working Process with MaxPatrol VM and NetBox

This detailed guide explains how organizations can implement effective asset and vulnerability management by focusing on reliable infrastructure data, IT collaboration, and automation. It draws from real-world projects using MaxPatrol VM, NetBox, and 1C:ERP to demonstrate dynamic grouping, webhook-driven asset onboarding, and deviation-based control. The approach emphasizes eight core principles including minimizing human dependency, just-in-time awareness, maximum data accuracy, and embedding security into existing IT workflows. Technical flows cover automatic scanning initiation upon asset creation in NetBox, categorization against unacceptable events, and priority-based patching cycles aligned with Patch Tuesday. Self-control mechanisms and PDQL queries enable ongoing validation of subnets, asset freshness, and compliance without excessive manual oversight. The framework is designed to be adaptable to any mature vulnerability management platform beyond the specific tools demonstrated.

FSTEC Publishes 35-Point Network Perimeter Recommendations, Most Require No Spending

Russia's FSTEC released non-binding recommendations on protecting network perimeters on March 10, 2026, analyzing real-world intrusion vectors from external networks. The 35-point checklist spans eight sections covering device administration, DDoS resilience, segmentation, configuration backups, vulnerability management, authentication, logging, and incident response exercises. Only four items explicitly require purchasing new tools such as WAF, ZTNA, NAC, and SIEM, while five others depend on existing infrastructure. Twenty-six points can be addressed through policy, inventory, and configuration changes alone, including enforcing unique passwords, disabling legacy protocols like HTTP and SNMP v1/v2, and quarterly backup restoration tests. The document references Order 117 and earlier FSTEC methodologies on vulnerability handling, serving as a practical self-assessment questionnaire rather than a mandatory regulation. Analysts note that many organizations still fail to implement low-cost measures such as excluding remote administration interfaces from DMZ zones and verifying backup recoverability.

NIST Bans Periodic Password Rotation While Russia's FSTEC Mandates 90-Day Changes for Government Systems

In July 2025, NIST released the final version of SP 800-63B, explicitly prohibiting periodic password changes with the requirement that verifiers and CSPs shall not require subscribers to change passwords periodically. Eight months later, in April 2026, FSTEC approved a methodological document requiring passwords in state information systems and critical information infrastructure to be changed at least every 90 days, with mobile devices limited to 30 days and no reuse of the last 12 passwords. The requirements originate from Order No. 117, which itself contains no mention of passwords, but delegates details to lower-level methodological documents including the April 2026 guide that defines measure IAF.3. Compliance is enforced through the KZI protected indicator calculation submitted to FSTEC twice a year, with penalties including zeroing of the 0.25 weight group for repeated failures and immediate zeroing during penetration testing. The policy applies to government bodies, state unitary enterprises, institutions, and CII subjects, while commercial organizations outside this scope retain flexibility to set their own policies based on threat models. NIST and FSTEC requirements align closely on minimum length, failed attempt limits, MFA for privileged accounts, and prohibition of default passwords, differing primarily on the rotation mandate.

2.2 Million Line Vulnerability Report: What Happens After Discovery and How to Turn Findings Into Action

A massive vulnerability scan produced an 1,819-page report and a 2.2-million-row Excel file that exceeded spreadsheet limits, highlighting the gap between detection and remediation. The article explains that finding vulnerabilities accounts for only 10 percent of the work, while the remaining 90 percent involves prioritization, remediation, verification, and ensuring issues do not reappear. Research from BI.ZONE, Sber, Qualys, Cyentia Institute, Kenna Security, and Hadrian shows that organizations can typically remediate only one in ten open vulnerabilities per month and that Time-to-Exploit has dropped dramatically, with many edge-device flaws exploited on the day of disclosure. The piece stresses that continuous scanning, full infrastructure coverage including shadow IT, and separate high-frequency perimeter scans are essential because 85 percent of KEV-vulnerable assets remain unpatched at disclosure time. It recommends replacing bulky reports with concise, role-specific registries that answer four questions: what to do, where to do it, by when, and the consequences of inaction. Three legitimate outcomes for every vulnerability are outlined: patching, compensating controls, or formal risk acceptance with defined review dates, while false positives such as orphaned OpenSSL libraries must be cleaned rather than ignored.

Bank of Russia Publishes Methodological Recommendations No. 3-MR on AI Security for Financial Market Participants

The Bank of Russia has released methodological recommendations No. 3-MR dated 16 June 2026, providing detailed guidance on ensuring information security during the development and use of artificial intelligence systems in the financial sector. The document builds on the earlier Code of Ethics for AI in finance and integrates with existing risk management, operational resilience, and data protection frameworks already familiar to credit institutions and other market participants. It introduces standardized terminology for AI-specific threats such as hallucinations, data drift, and poisoned datasets while outlining six risk categories and a four-stage AI system lifecycle model. Organizations are advised to apply threat modeling based on FSTEC methodology, implement proportional controls across data preparation, development, training, and operation phases, and maintain human oversight for high-risk automated processes. Special attention is given to supply chain risks involving third-party vendors and open-source components, requiring due diligence, provenance tracking, and contractual safeguards aligned with existing outsourcing standards. The recommendations remain non-binding yet signal clear regulatory expectations that are likely to influence future compliance checks and audits.

Understanding SCA: How Software Composition Analysis Helps Manage Software Supply Chain Risks

Software Composition Analysis (SCA) has emerged as a critical tool for organizations seeking to understand and control the risks hidden within modern applications built from third-party components, open-source libraries, container images, and transitive dependencies. SCA tools scan projects to identify components, versions, dependency chains, known vulnerabilities, and license issues, providing visibility that traditional security methods often miss. The approach supports SBOM generation and integrates with standards such as SPDX, CycloneDX, and VEX to improve transparency across the software supply chain. Organizations use SCA throughout the development lifecycle—from dependency selection and build-time gating to post-release monitoring—to reduce reaction time when new vulnerabilities appear and to manage technical debt, licensing conflicts, and abandoned packages. In regulated environments, including compliance with Russian standards like GOST R 56939-2024 and FSTEC requirements, SCA helps teams demonstrate control over software composition and prepare evidence for certification. While powerful, SCA is not a silver bullet: it relies on accurate data, cannot detect zero-days, and requires careful policy tuning to avoid alert fatigue or developer workarounds.

RZD Trunk Quantum Network Obtains FSTEC Attestation and Enters External Commercial Market

Russia’s state-owned railway operator RZD has successfully passed certification by the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC), confirming that its trunk quantum network meets the requirements for information systems of the second protection class. The attestation enables RZD to begin offering quantum-secured communication services to external organizations, including banks, industrial enterprises, medical institutions, and transport companies. Quantum key distribution technology allows any interception attempt to be detected because interference with the quantum channel alters the state of transmitted particles, providing a level of security far beyond conventional encryption methods. The network is already being tested by the Bank of Russia, the Federal Treasury, the Financial University, and several major banks, with potential clients also identified in the oil-and-gas, industrial, healthcare, and transportation sectors. The Ministry of Digital Development considers the technology sufficiently mature and has included further expansion of the quantum network through 2030 in the national “Data Economy” project roadmap. As a result, RZD is gradually transforming from a traditional carrier of passengers and cargo into an operator of protected digital highways.