Gentlemen

Russian Ransomware Groups INC and The Gentlemen Deploy AI-Driven Phantom Framework for Fully Automated Attacks

SOCRadar researchers have disclosed the Phantom framework, an AI-powered autonomous ransomware attack platform operated by members linked to the INC and The Gentlemen groups. The system uses commercial large language models routed through OpenRouter to scan 7,158 edge devices, steal 535 administrator accounts, and compromise 4,140 endpoints. AI agents autonomously generate custom encryption binaries, craft personalized ransom demands based on stolen financial data, and write kernel drivers to disable EDR solutions before encryption. The framework runs on 32 custom MCP servers that give the AI direct access to scanning, credential abuse, financial analysis, and anti-detection tooling. Human operators only supply target prompts and approve final actions while the AI executes the entire kill chain. Phantom Agent v3.1 implants masquerade as Windows Update components and communicate over encrypted channels with randomized polling intervals. The discovery reveals a mature Ransomware-as-a-Service model that lowers the barrier for other criminal groups to conduct large-scale AI-automated extortion.

Ransomware Operators Linked to The Gentlemen Deploy TukTuk C2 Framework for Espionage and Credential Theft

Operators associated with the ransomware group The Gentlemen have adopted a new command-and-control framework called TukTuk to steal credentials, monitor compromised systems, and prepare environments for ransomware deployment. The framework was discovered on a server that also hosted tools for disabling EDR solutions, research on vulnerable drivers, and data apparently stolen from two large organizations. TukTuk includes agents for both Windows and Linux, along with its own backend and management panel that allows remote command execution, file transfers, screen capture, and device tracking through a single interface. One notable feature displays a fake Windows Security window on the victim's machine to capture entered credentials and send them directly to the attackers' panel. Researchers identified a DLL sideloading technique that abuses the legitimate Greenshot.exe executable to load a malicious log4net.dll library and launch the TukTuk agent. The server also contained EDRKiller, WarsawKiller, and UnknownKiller tools, plus materials on BYOVD attacks that leverage vulnerable legitimate drivers to gain kernel access and interfere with security products.