redb.Identity Deploys Three-Layer Defense to Neutralize Stolen Access Tokens in OpenID Connect
redb.Identity, a custom OAuth 2.1 and OpenID Connect provider built on .NET, addresses the inherent risks of bearer access tokens by implementing three distinct protection layers. The first layer uses a Backend-for-Frontend pattern with Blazor Server and HttpOnly cookies to ensure no tokens ever reach the browser. The second layer applies DPoP proof-of-possession binding so that a stolen token remains useless without the corresponding private key. The third layer provides rapid revocation through RFC 7009 endpoints, refresh token rotation, idle timeouts, and a hybrid push-pull backchannel logout mechanism that guarantees no revocation is lost across replicas. The architecture also mitigates XSS vectors from direct application code, compromised npm dependencies, browser extensions, and localStorage. Additional routine controls include constant-time secret comparison, TOTP replay protection, rate limiting at multiple scopes, and sanitized proxy headers. The design explicitly acknowledges that BFF shifts rather than eliminates risk, requiring complementary CSRF protection via SameSite cookies and antiforgery tokens.
HabrSep 8, 2026Translated from Russian