
Hacker or Engineer? Reconstructing Attack Chains in Industrial OT Networks
Positive Technologies expert Anton Kutepov presents a detailed educational scenario from the Standoff online polygon to demonstrate how security teams can trace an attack from initial perimeter compromise to unauthorized writes on a PLC. The case begins with an unexpected SCADA server command to a hydrocracking unit controller outside the maintenance window. By correlating network traffic, endpoint telemetry, authentication logs, and asset context, analysts reconstruct the full path: exploitation of a vulnerable DMZ system, lateral movement via Kerberoasting and Active Directory certificate abuse, RDP access to an engineering workstation, and finally weakening of Windows Defender on the SCADA server before issuing the control command. The analysis shows that a single permitted industrial protocol operation becomes suspicious only when placed in the context of prior defensive control changes and anomalous access routes. The article stresses that protecting OT environments requires continuous asset inventory, unified telemetry from traffic and endpoints, and pre-approved response playbooks that avoid disrupting the physical process.
HabrOct 13, 2026Translated from Russian
