From Polish sources

Malicious Claude Code Update 2.1.313 Distributed via Cursor Marketplace Infects Up to 5,000 Users

Security researchers at OpenSourceMalware discovered a trojanized version of the official Claude Code extension from Anthropic that was pushed as a legitimate update through the Cursor IDE marketplace. The malicious package, version 2.1.313, inserted a 66-line loader that added an attacker-controlled SSH key named svc-telemetry to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, established a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82.225, deployed persistence mechanisms, and exfiltrated host metadata including IP address, hostname, username, OS details, Git email, and names of environment variables containing KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, PASS, AWS, or GCP. The campaign ran for roughly eleven hours on 29 October 2026 and was limited exclusively to the Cursor marketplace; no malicious versions appeared in Open VSX or the Microsoft VS Code Marketplace. Cursor responded by removing the package, rebuilding the marketplace, rotating keys, and disabling the attacker-controlled server at 134.209.82.225:8099. The company stated that at most 5,000 users installed the compromised update and committed to direct outreach while recommending isolation, SSH key removal, persistence cleanup, and credential rotation. The incident highlights supply-chain risks associated with automatic extension updates and the difficulty of detecting tampering when a legitimate publisher’s name and signing appear intact.

CyberXero Deploys Swarm of 51 AI Agents Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure

Researchers at SOCRadar uncovered the CyberXero campaign after discovering an openly accessible HTTP server at 46.21.250.135 that exposed the group's full workspace, logs, tools, and stolen data. The operation ran two parallel tracks using the same infrastructure: one mass campaign against WordPress and e-commerce sites worldwide, and a targeted strike on Ukraine's energy sector and critical infrastructure. Attackers created 51 specialized AI agents inside the Claude Code environment to automate reconnaissance, vulnerability identification, exploit chaining, and data exfiltration. They also integrated the PentAGI framework with Cobalt Strike for payload generation and attack automation while bypassing model refusals by claiming authorized penetration tests. The group relied on known vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-4815 in WooCommerce rather than zero-days, achieving rapid results including 4,708 hosts scanned and 32 webshells deployed in 61 seconds. The campaign resulted in the theft of 628,000 records, primarily from a Kharkiv heating supplier, containing names, addresses, account numbers, and energy consumption details.