CrowdSec Confirms Theft of Source Code from Roughly 300 GitHub Repositories via TanStack Supply Chain Attack

French cybersecurity firm CrowdSec has confirmed that attackers stole source code from approximately 300 GitHub repositories, including around 170 private ones. The breach occurred in May 2026 through a compromised TanStack component that exfiltrated an API key with read access to the private codebase. The stolen material included code for the company's SaaS console, AWS procedures, connectors, and automation tools, while the remaining repositories contained already-public open source code. No customer data, passwords, organization details, tokens, or other secrets were included in the leak, and all potentially affected credentials were immediately rotated. CrowdSec stated that the code is tightly integrated with internal systems and has largely changed over the past four months, reducing its usefulness outside the company's environment. The SaaS service code undergoes regular audits, and the company sees no immediate threat from the exposure while the investigation continues.

AntiMalwareSeptember 21, 2026Translated from Russian

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French cybersecurity company CrowdSec has confirmed a significant source code leak affecting roughly 300 GitHub repositories, around 170 of which were private. The incident occurred in May 2026 but was only discovered on 16 September.

The attackers gained initial access through a supply chain compromise involving the TanStack library. A compromised component used by CrowdSec exfiltrated an API key that granted read access to the private code repositories.

The stolen code included the SaaS console, various AWS procedures, connectors, and automation tooling. More than 130 additional repositories contained open source code that was already publicly available.

CrowdSec stated that no customer data, usernames, passwords, or organization information was exposed. Investigators also found no tokens or secrets that could have enabled further movement within the infrastructure.

All potentially affected keys and credentials were rotated immediately after discovery. The company believes the stolen code would be difficult to weaponize outside its own environment because it is tightly coupled to internal data and tools, and a substantial portion of the components have changed over the past four months.

The SaaS service code undergoes regular security audits, and CrowdSec currently sees no direct threat from the exposure. The investigation remains ongoing, and the company continues to monitor for any suspicious activity.

GitHub CrowdSec TanStack

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