Ethersphere's bee-js and Swarm Desktop Hit by Supply Chain Attack Delivering Wallet-Stealing Malware

Attackers compromised Ethersphere's automated release processes to publish malicious versions of bee-js 13.3.0 on npm and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 on GitHub. The packages used postinstall scripts and startup routines to download a loader from api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz that exfiltrated Swarm node wallet keys and plaintext passwords while installing persistent backdoors. The bee-js package remained available for roughly 75 minutes and was pulled by dependent projects including swarm-cli and bee-dashboard, while Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 reached automatic update channels on Windows and Apple Silicon Macs. Maintainers later confirmed the releases originated from the bee-worker CI account using stolen credentials and responded by revoking certificates and requiring manual approval for future signing workflows. No fund thefts had been reported at publication time, yet both Socket and SafeDep advise treating any affected system as fully compromised. The campaign reuses infrastructure previously linked to fake Solidity extensions on Open VSX and the SleepyDuck group.

The Hacker NewsTranslated from English

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Attackers compromised the automated publishing pipelines of the Ethersphere project to distribute malicious versions of bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2, two components supporting the Swarm decentralized storage network.

The tainted bee-js release appeared on npm for approximately 75 minutes beginning at 00:09 UTC on November 9, 2026. Because the package executed its payload as an npm postinstall script, any installation performed during that window triggered the malware even without explicit import by the consuming project.

Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 was published via the project's GitHub release automation at 00:36 UTC and remained available for 8.5 hours. The application's built-in updater pushed the malicious build to Windows x64 and Apple Silicon systems within roughly ten minutes, according to analysis by supply-chain security firm Socket.

Both releases contained identical loader code that retrieved additional payloads from api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz. The downloaded components searched for Swarm Desktop configuration files containing the node's encrypted keystore and plaintext password, then transmitted them to attacker-controlled servers.

On Linux and macOS the malware installed a Go-based remote shell named evjawbreaker inside a hidden ~/.solidity directory and registered it as a user service or LaunchAgent. On Windows it deployed a legitimate ScreenConnect client signed by ConnectWise and granted it system-level privileges.

Project maintainers later stated that the releases were created using stolen CI credentials belonging to the bee-worker automation account. They have since restricted signing workflows to the main branch and added mandatory approval steps.

Security firms Socket and SafeDep recommend treating every machine that installed either package as fully compromised and advise rotating all credentials while rebuilding systems from trusted images where possible.

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