BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter to Compromise Russian Firm's Code-Signing Server

Kaspersky's ICS CERT investigated a months-long intrusion by the Ukrainian-origin threat group BO Team into an undisclosed Russian software developer's network. The attackers gained initial access via an exposed SSH service on a Linux terminal server and escalated privileges by exploiting CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) in a VMware vCenter 7.0.3 instance to obtain root access. They deployed persistent backdoors on hypervisors, abused legitimate tools including SSH, SCP, and domain credentials, and reached the organization's GitLab instance and code-signing server. The operation showed clear interest in supply-chain compromise through code injection or theft of signing certificates, though rapid response prevented final-stage execution. BO Team avoided heavy malware use, relying instead on living-off-the-land techniques, credential dumping via Nanodump and comsvcs.dll, and systematic log deletion. The activity originated from Ukrainian IP addresses and followed a standard work schedule aligned with the victim's time zone.

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An investigation by Kaspersky ICS CERT has revealed a prolonged compromise of a Russian software developer's infrastructure by the threat actor BO Team (also tracked as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy). The group maintained access for several months after initial entry in 2025, stealing confidential data and fully compromising Windows and Linux servers, hypervisors, backup systems, and network equipment.

The attackers began by compromising a Linux terminal server through an exposed SSH service. From this foothold they performed extensive reconnaissance of internal services including SMB, Kerberos, SSH, and WinRM, then pivoted to virtualization infrastructure. After failed attempts to access the VMware vCenter web interface, they successfully exploited CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) on a version 7.0.3 server to obtain root command execution.

With root access the group installed a cron-based backdoor named pgcache that downloaded and executed the Global Socket utility for persistent remote control. They later abused the compromised hypervisor certificate to move laterally into a second virtualization cluster and used stolen credentials to reach the GitLab platform and the organization's code-signing server.

BO Team employed living-off-the-land techniques, domain administrator accounts, and utilities such as Nanodump and comsvcs.dll to dump LSASS and extract credentials. The group also modified system binaries to harvest passwords and used the nofrillsdns service for covert command-and-control. Although the attackers reached the code-signing server, rapid incident response prevented them from injecting malicious code or exfiltrating the signing certificate.

The activity originated from IP addresses in Ukraine and followed a predictable work schedule. Kaspersky assesses that BO Team intended a supply-chain attack against the developer's customers but was unable to complete the operation after detection and remediation.

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